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Political scientists and law professors have lately taken to asserting
that quantitative studies of judging reveal worrisome findings about the
rule of law in the U.S. judicial system. The authors of Are Judges
Political? declare: “variations in panel composition lead to
dramatically different outcomes, in a way that creates serious problems
for the rule of law.”1 The authors of Judging on a Collegial Court
similarly conclude:
Because separate opinions and reversals constitute behavioral
manifestations of judges’ discretionary authority, studies of dissensus
shed light on critical questions related to the effective functioning and
legitimacy of our legal system and the operation of the rule of
law. . . . Our findings cut both ways. The evidence we have presented
in the preceding pages of this book demonstrates that judging is both
a legal and a political activity . . . .2

Surveying the results of recent quantitative studies of judging, Cass
Sunstein and Thomas Miles observe that “[f]or those who believe in
the rule of law, and in the discipline imposed by the legal system, the
results of the New Legal Realism need not be entirely discouraging.
The glass is half empty, perhaps, but it is also half full.”3
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2. VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, JUDGING
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(2006).
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The rule of law is often said to be a defining aspect of the
American system of governance—the foundation stone of our free
society—in which judges play a pivotal role.4 It is alarming to be
informed that serious problems in judging threaten the rule of law or
that the rule of law glass is half empty. If these concerns are valid,
remedial measures must be sought and implemented without delay.
But are they correct? Have studies of judging shown that the rule
of law is in trouble? To evaluate these assertions, one must first know
what the rule of law requires of judges; then one must identify or
measure how much and in what ways judges are falling short of these
requirements. To say that the rule of law glass is half full, continuing
with Sunstein’s and Miles’s metaphor, requires knowing what a full
glass of the rule of law looks like: there must be rule of law baselines
or standards.
A quick look at these studies exposes the need for such baselines.
The authors of Are Judges Political? find that “[f]requently the law is
clear, and judges should and will simply implement it, no matter who
has appointed them.”5 Their study provides “considerable evidence to
suggest that they do exactly that”;6 in five major areas studied they find
no ideological effect on judicial decisions, and even when an effect did
show, the differences, they admit, were “not huge.”7 A study was not
necessary to show that judges do not vary greatly by ideology in their
legal decisions because typically about 90 percent of federal appellate
decisions (more when unpublished cases are counted) are issued
without a dissent. Judges, then, agree an overwhelming proportion of
the time regardless of ideological differences. By that measure, at least,
the rule of law appears to be working well.
The authors of Judging on a Collegial Court find that ideological
differences show a statistically significant increase in the probability of
a dissent or a concurrence. But it turns out that the size of the effect—
its actual impact on the run of decisions—was minuscule: “The
difference in absolute terms is rather small, with slightly less than a 0.01
increase in the probability of a concurrence and a 0.02 increase in the
844 (2008).
4. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 2, 104
(2004) (explaining that “the defining characteristic of the Western political tradition is ‘freedom
under the rule of law’” and discussing the role of judges in “find[ing] a balance” between
individual freedom and the rule of law).
5. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 129.
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probability of a dissent.”8 That is hardly worrisome. Confounding the
authors’ expectations, furthermore, their study finds no statistically
significant correlation between ideological difference and rates of
reversal—that is, appellate panels did not reverse trial judges with an
opposing ideological disposition at a higher rate. This study, covering
decisions by nearly a thousand judges over four decades, would appear
to confirm that political views have little impact on judicial decisions,
yet, without explaining why, the authors suggest that their findings “cut
both ways” on the rule of law.
Behind the disquieting assertions about the rule of law lies an
unstated assumption: the proposition that any finding of political
influence on judging, no matter how small, is contrary to the rule of
law. This, however, is a profoundly unrealistic assumption—ironically
so, because these political scientists and law professors claim the
mantle of legal realism.
I. BALANCED REALISM ABOUT JUDGING
For more than a century, judges and jurists in the United States
have expressed a view of judging that I call “balanced realism.”9
Balanced realism recognizes that there are gaps and uncertainties in
the law, that sometimes judges have discretion and must make choices,
that different judges can sometimes interpret the same law in different
ways owing to differences in perspective and background, that
inconsistent precedents or conflicts in the applicable law can exist, and
that sometimes judges manipulate the law to reach desired ends. (I call
these factors the “skeptical aspects.”) But balanced realism also
recognizes that a substantial majority of the time, the rules and their
application are clear and predictable, that judges are indoctrinated into
a shared legal tradition and legal practices that lead then to interpret
and apply legal rules in similar ways, that judging takes place in a thick
institutional setting that constrains judges, that most judges strive to
abide by the commitment to follow the law, and that the overwhelming
majority of judicial decisions are legally determined (the “rule-bound”
aspects). Balanced realism acknowledges the limitations inherent in
the law and in human judges—limitations that cannot be eliminated—
yet it also recognizes that law nonetheless works, that judges can and
do render rule-bound decisions.
8. HETTINGER ET AL., supra note 2, at 65.
9. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING 6–7 (2010).
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Judge Benjamin Cardozo famously articulated a balanced realism
about judging in The Nature of the Judicial Process:
No doubt there is a field within which judicial judgment moves
untrammeled by fixed principles. Obscurity of statute or of precedent
or of customs or of morals, or collision between some or all of them,
may leave the law unsettled, and cast a duty upon the courts to declare
it retrospectively in the exercise of a power frankly legislative in
function.10

Cardozo insisted that when making these decisions a judge must decide
in terms of the community view, not the judge’s personal view, but he
was aware that it is difficult to keep the two apart: “The perception of
the objective right takes the color of the subjective mind.”11 But despite
the inherent openness of law and the limitations of human judges,
Cardozo reminded his audience, “[w]e must not let these occasional
and relatively rare instances blind our eyes to the innumerable
instances where there is neither obscurity nor collision nor opportunity
for diverse judgment.”12
Multiple judges before and after Cardozo have described judging
in similar terms. In 1886, for example, Judge Thomas Cooley
emphasized that uncertainty in the application of law cannot be
eliminated
because in the infinite variety of human transactions it becomes
uncertain which of the opposing rules the respective parties contend
for should be applied in a case having no exact parallel, and because
it cannot possibly be known in advance what view a court or jury will
take of questions upon which there is room for difference of
opinion.13

Differences in the judicial application of law, he wrote, “must always
exist so long as there is variety in human minds, human standards, and
human transactions.”14 In 1924, Judge Irving Lehman acknowledged
that “no thoughtful judge can fail to note that in conferences of the
court, differences of opinion are based at least to some extent upon
differences of viewpoint.”15 Judge Bernard Shientag remarked in 1944,
10. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 128 (1921).
11. Id. at 110–11.
12. Id. at 129.
13. Thomas M. Cooley, Another View of Codification, 2 COLUM. JURIST 464, 465 (1886).
14. Id. at 465–66.
15. Irving Lehman, The Influence of the Universities on Judicial Decisions, 10 CORNELL L.Q.
1, 6 (1924).
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[n]aturally, it is in cases where the creative faculty of the judicial
process operates, where there is a choice of competing analogies, that
the personality of the judge, the individual tone of his mind, the color
of his experience, the character and variety of his interests and his
prepossessions, all play an important role.16

Judge Albert Tate observed in 1959, “like all other human
beings[, judges] have limitations, of vision, knowledge, intelligence, or
predisposition which sometimes influence their judicial actions.”17 In
1963, Judge Charles Clark admitted that cases arise in which there is
no clear legal answer, and the judge “is on his own for the ultimate
result which must reflect his background, his personality, and his inner
convictions.”18 And so on.
This encapsulates what many judges have said about judging: the
bulk of the law is clear, but the law has a margin of uncertainty; judges
try their best to rule in an objective fashion, but their personal views
sometimes seep through to influence their decisions. The crucial point
is that law cannot be made perfectly certain and judges cannot be made
to reason like machines, entirely free of background influences. These
inherent aspects of judging shape and constrain what is possible. “The
rule of law is not the doctrine of perfect decision,” Judge Alvin Rubin
counseled: “[I]n many cases a conscientious decision is as much as can
be expected, and . . . there is no ultimate ‘right’ answer.”19
Now it is possible to identify the fundamental flaw in the
assumption that any showing of political influence on judicial decisions
is inconsistent with the rule of law. A realistic understanding of the rule
of law would assume that a certain irreducible amount of ideological
influence will be present even in the best system of judging.20 As judges
have repeatedly stated, it cannot be otherwise. A realistic view would
therefore expect that quantitative studies will find statistically
significant correlations in certain contexts between ideology and
judicial decisions. This finding in itself, without more, says nothing at
all about the rule of law, because it is an inherent aspect of judging. Or
to put the point another way, a full glass of the rule of law, like a full

16. BERNARD L. SHIENTAG, THE PERSONALITY OF THE JUDGE 51 (1944).
17. Albert Tate, Jr., Forum Juridicum: The Judge as a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 439 (1959).
18. Charles E. Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1963).
19. Alvin B. Rubin, Views from the Lower Court, 23 UCLA L. REV. 448, 453–54 (1976).
20. Nor is it clear that the legal system would be better if these aspects could be eliminated.
These factors, the openness of law and the influence of background views of judges, help law
change in sync with changes in society.
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glass of milk, is not filled to the brim. The open space between the lip
of the glass and the surface of a full glass of the rule of law is where
legal uncertainty interacts with the limitations of human judges—
where political influences typically come into play.
For the rule of law, what matters is the size of the ideological effect
and in what contexts it manifests itself: whether it is greater than, or
extends beyond or outside of, what one would expect in a well
functioning system of rule-bound judging. Rule of law baselines are
necessary to identify what to expect of a full glass of the rule of law.
Quantitative studies can raise serious concerns about the rule of law
only if their results establish that judicial decisions fall measurably
below these baselines. Only then would grounds exist to assert that the
rule of law glass is half full, or nearly empty.
II. CONSTRUCTING RULE OF LAW BASELINES
Throughout this Essay, I have referred to baselines in the plural
because a number of standards will be necessary to account for
variations in the nature of legal provisions and the circumstances of
judging. Two factors have particular bearing on the formulation of
standards: the type of legal issue a judge is called upon to decide, and
the level of the court.
In connection with the first factor, certain legal provisions—
especially legal standards like “fairness,” “reasonableness,” or “the
best interests of the child”—explicitly call upon judges to exercise
discretion or to make judgments of a type that allows or invites (or
makes it harder to screen out) the expression of personal views.
Consequently, a rule of law baseline for this type of question, which
remains legally governed and hence should manifest a significant
degree of agreement, would anticipate greater variation among judges
and higher correlations between their decisions and their ideological
views in comparison to a rule of law baseline for narrow legal rules.
The second factor recognizes that the quantum of legal
uncertainty is greater at higher court levels. The vast majority of cases
are settled (fewer than two percent of federal cases make it through
trial) because the applicable law and provable facts are clear, so both
parties can weigh the expected costs and benefits of continuing. About
ten to fifteen percent of federal appellate cases, by the estimate of a
number of federal judges,21 involve hard or uncertain legal issues. In

21. See TAMANAHA, supra note 9, at 125–31, 144.
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contrast, the skeptical aspects of law recognized by balanced realism—
uncertainty, disagreement, choice, political pressure—show up in a
significantly higher proportion of Supreme Court cases, whereas the
rule-bound aspects are proportionally less present (including fewer
institutional checks). This represents a virtual inversion of the usual
balance of these factors within law and judging generally, although
Supreme Court decisionmaking is still thickly draped in legal
constraints. In recognition of these differences, rule of law baselines for
trial courts and appellate courts should anticipate far greater
agreement in legal decisions and significantly lower ideologically
correlated variations in comparison with high courts (both state and
federal).
Needless to say, the task of formulating rule of law baselines will
be complicated, requiring ingenuity and much trial and error. This task
can be done in a variety of ways, all contestable. Every baseline
produced should be viewed with caution, as a proxy that stands for an
approximation of an abstraction—a gross quantitative marker for what
to expect from rule-bound judges.
Seeking out comparative measures is one way to proceed. For
example, assume that over a seventy-five-year span conservative
judges vote in the conservative direction in about fifty-five percent of
their cases, whereas liberal judges vote conservative in about fifty
percent of their cases.22 The relatively small five percent difference in
voting behavior, one might surmise, reflects the irrepressible
interaction of legal uncertainty with human judging. This historical
norm could supply the basis for a rule of law baseline for federal
appellate judging. A warning sign that the judicial system is in trouble,
then, might be if judges as a group skew their votes in a one-sided
ideological direction in a significantly higher proportion of cases,
creating a greater than usual disparity between Republican- and
Democratic-appointed judges.23 Moreover, individual judges whose
decisions fall far outside of this historical range might invite scrutiny
for failing to rule in a sufficiently rule-bound fashion. One might create
similar baselines for the Supreme Court, derived from historical norms
or from a comparison of the voting patterns of Justices against one
another. This would allow a determination of whether a particular

22. This example is a simplified and modified version of a study reported by Judge Richard
Posner. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 21 (2008).
23. With respect to voting trends, Judge Posner’s study indeed shows an increase in the
ideological disparity among currently sitting judges. Id.
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Court or a particular Justice shows a propensity to rule in an
ideological direction that exceeds the usual, historical range.
Setting aside levels of courts, one might also compare differences
across legal issues to see whether some issues show greater
ideologically linked divergence in judicial decisions than others.
Applying different rule of law baselines for standards (expecting
greater divergence) and for rules (expecting less) will make it possible
to tease out whether the observed increase in divergence is a function
of the type of legal provision at issue, or of something else (perhaps
political salience or entrenched cognitive biases).
These are just illustrative suggestions. Many factors must be
considered before rule of law baselines can be constructed—work that
has not yet begun.
III. LEGITIMATE OBJECTIONS TO RULE OF LAW BASELINES
Critics may object that it is misguided or wrong to construct such
baselines, that the goal itself is ludicrous because the rule of law is a
deeply contested ideal with uncertain meaning and implications for
judging. Furthermore, critics might argue, quantitative standards that
purport to provide a basis to evaluate judging will compress the
complexity and nuance of judging in a distorting oversimplification that
is susceptible to pernicious uses. These are compelling objections. I
would not proffer this proposal but for the worry that leaving this gap
unaddressed might be worse than the distortions that result from the
effort to fill it.
As the first paragraph of this Essay reveals, political scientists and
law professors, perhaps succumbing to the temptation to sell their
results, have issued broad, alarming claims about the implications of
their quantitative studies for the rule of law. These claims, I have
argued, do not follow from the results of their studies in the absence of
rule of law baselines, and they paint a false image of the state of
judging. Rule of law baselines will impose greater discipline on scholars
who wish to draw out broader implications from their results and will
provide a sounder footing for their observations.
This effort will also lead to an important advance in the discipline
of quantitative studies. Quantitative scholars demonstrate time and
again through their studies that judging is not a purely legal activity.
This point is not informative. Dozens of judges have admitted for
decades that sometimes law is uncertain or runs out, that judges must
sometimes make choices, and that sometimes their personal views have
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an impact on their legal decisions.24 That is the nature of law and of
human judging. The formulation of rule of law baselines would
constitute a major advance within the field, because these baselines
would formally incorporate the recognition of this reality, affecting the
orientation and design of the next generation of studies. Future
quantitative studies would produce information worthy of attention,
not when merely finding indications of ideological influence, but when
finding a notable deviation from expected baselines. Absent rule of law
baselines, these rapidly multiplying studies will merely confirm what
everyone in law already knows.

24. See TAMANAHA, supra note 9, chs. 7–8.

